Abstract. We describe a model-theoretic approach to ordinal analysis via the finite combinatorial notion of an α-large set of natural numbers. In contrast to syntactic approaches that use cut elimination, this approach involves constructing finite sets of numbers with combinatorial properties that, in nonstandard instances, give rise to models of the theory being analyzed. This method is applied to obtain ordinal analyses of a number of interesting subsystems of first-and second-order arithmetic.
x1. Introduction. Two of proof theory's defining goals are the justification of classical theories on constructive grounds, and the extraction of constructive information from classical proofs. Since Gentzen, ordinal analysis has been a major component in these pursuits, and the assignment of recursive ordinals to theories has proven to be an illuminating way of measuring their constructive strength. The traditional approach to ordinal analysis, which uses cut-elimination procedures to transform proofs in various deductive calculi, has a very syntactic flavor. The goal of this paper is to describe an alternative, model-theoretic approach, one that we hope will find favor with mathematicians of a more semantic bent. Basically these techniques are modifications of known ones, but new here is the adaptation of these techniques to second-order theories.
The origins of our approach can be found in the 1970's, in which Paris and others [13, 15] explored the use of finite combinatorial principles that, in nonstandard instances, give rise to models of arithmetic. A crowning achievement of this pursuit is the Paris-Harrington statement [16, 10, 11] , a slight variant of the Ramsey's theorem for finite sets that is equivalent to the 1-consistency of Peano Arithmetic (PA). Ketonen and Solovay [12] later developed the notion of an α-large set for ordinal notations α, and used it to determine effective bounds on the numbers asserted to exist by Paris and Harrington's combinatorial statement. In [15] Paris showed how to use the notion of α-large interval to build models of the theories I Σ n for n 1 (i.e., the theories obtained by restricting the induction axioms of PA to Σ 0 nformulas). In [30, 32] the second author extended these methods to apply to fragments of PA based on transfinite induction, yielding sharp upper bounds on their proof-theoretic strength; similar work has been carried out by Kotlarski and Ratajczyk (see [14, 19] ). As a by-product, these methods also provide natural "indicators" (see [10, 11, 15, 13] ) for the theories in question.
In this paper we hope to convince the reader that such combinatorial methods provide an important alternative to cut elimination when it comes to ordinal analysis. The complementarity of the approach can be summarized as follows: with cut-elimination, one unwinds proofs to obtain cut-free proof trees with height bounded by an ordinal; in our constructions, one starts with an ordinally-large interval and uses that to construct a model of the theory in question.
The outline of this paper is as follows. In Sections 2 through 6 we present an overview of our methods, set down preliminary definitions and conventions, and discuss the way in which our constructions yield ordinal analyses. In Section 7 we construct a model of the first-order theory I Σ 1 , and in Section 8 we discuss the construction of second-order objects like Turing jumps. In Section 9 we use these ideas to build a model of WKL 0 . A suitable iteration of the Turing jump construction gives us finite jump hierarchies, which are useful in constructing models of I Σ n , PA, ACA 0 , and Σ All the theories analyzed in this paper have proof-theoretic strength at most that of Peano Arithmetic. These methods, however, are extended to stronger "predicative" theories in [4] , where we use appropriately large nonstandard intervals to build models of theories of strength up to Γ 0 (and, in fact, just a little bit beyond). These constructions employ a transfinite jump lemma that extends the finite jump lemma introduced here.
For more information on the traditional ordinal analyses of the theories discussed here and in [4] , as well as proofs that the bounds we give are sharp (obtained by proving instances of transfinite induction within the theories themselves), see, for example, [17, 18, 20, 24, 6, 25] . For information on theories of first-order arithmetic, see [10, 11] , and for more information on the relevant theories of second-order arithmetic, see, for example, [26, 27, 28, 6, 2, 3] .
x2. Overview. In this section we give an informal introduction to the model-theoretic techniques we will use below. Given a theory T , our goal is to determine an ordinal notation α that provides an upper bound to its proof-theoretic strength. If T is a theory in the language of first-order arithmetic, we will use the combinatorial notion of an α-large interval of natural numbers [a, b] to construct a model of T . In fact, we'll show that if is false, and hence this assertion is not provable in T . On the other hand, in a weak base theory one can prove (1) using transfinite induction up to α, and so as a corollary we obtain an instance of transfinite induction up to α that cannot be proven in T . This is one sense in which the strength of T is bounded by α, and is one of the usual consequences of a traditional ordinal analysis. We will discuss some of the other consequences of an ordinal analysis, and the way they can be obtained from our model-theoretic constructions, in Section 6.
In order to construct the initial segment I that models T , we will use the combinatorial properties of [a, b] to construct a set A = fa 0 , a 1 , . . . , a k g [a, b] with further combinatorial properties that guarantee that if I is any "limit" of A, I will satisfy the axioms of T . For example, if the elements a i have been listed in increasing order and k is nonstandard, then the set
fxjx < a i g will be an initial segment of M in which elements of A occur cofinally, and will therefore serve our purposes.
In this paper we will be concerned moreover with theories T in the language of second-order arithmetic, which include variables that range over sets of natural numbers. To construct a model of T , we will have to specify the universe of sets that are to interpret these variables as well. Given a set S coded by a single element of the first-order model M in some reasonable way, we will write S I = S \ I, so that S I is a subset of I . All the sets in our second-order models will be of this form, and so our task will be to come up with combinatorial conditions on sets S that guarantee that S I will satisfy appropriate axioms of T in any limit I of A. When such is the case we will say that S "approximates" the desired property in A. In short, then, our constructions take the following form:
(1) we show that if [a, b] is α-large, we can construct sets A, S, and so on, having certain combinatorial properties; and (2) we show that if I is any limit of A, these combinatorial properties enable us to extract a model of T in which the first-order universe is I .
After fixing some conventions in the next section, we will discuss the relevant ordinals and notation systems in Section 4, define the notion of an α-large interval in Section 5, and describe the proof-theoretic consequences of our techniques in Section 6. The first application of the techniques themselves will appear in Section 7, when we begin by building a model of I Σ 1 .
x3. Preliminaries. Though the following list of preliminaries regarding models and theories of arithmetic is long, most of the definitions and conventions are either standard or easily deduced from context. As a result, the reader may want to just skim this section and return to it as necessary. For more detail on the topics of this section the reader is referred to [10, 11] .
The language of first-order arithmetic includes a constant zero symbol, function symbols for the operations successor, plus, and times, and a lessthan relation. When we speak of true arithmetic, we mean the set of sentences in this language that are true in the standard model. As described in the previous section, we need to construct objects in a nonstandard model of true arithmetic, so we fix a particular such model M from the outset. M will be used to denote the universe of M.
An initial segment of M is a subset of I of M that is closed downwards, that is, if a 2 I and b < a, then b 2 I . An initial segment I is a cut if it is closed under the successor operation, and proper if it is not equal to all of M . Note that if I is a proper cut of M then I is not definable in M, since any first-order formula defining it would represent a failure of induction in the model.
Though the variables of the language of first-order arithmetic range over natural numbers, modulo coding we can take the universe to include finitary objects like ordered pairs, finite sets, and finite sequences as well. For example, if S is an element of M , we can interpret i 2 S to represent the assertion that "the ith bit of the binary expansion of S is equal to 1." In this situation we will say that the set S is coded in M, or even more concisely, S is in M. Similar conventions hold for other finitary objects as well.
If A is a subset of M and we write A = fa 0 , a 1 , . . . , a k g it is to be assumed that we have listed the elements of a i in increasing order. A cut I is a limit of A if elements of A occur cofinally in I . For example, if k is nonstandard and we take I = def i2 fxjx < a i g then I will be a limit of A. If I is a cut containing a but not b, we can indicate this fact by writing a < I < b.
If I is also closed under plus and times, we will also use I to denote the model for the language of first-order arithmetic, with the operations that are derived from M. 
We will use ha, bi to denote an ordered pair with elements a and b, and if s is a sequence in M we will let s i denote the ith element of s. If S is a set in M, we use the notation S i to denote the ith slice of S, namely S i = def fa j hi, ai 2 Sg.
Though this introduces some ambiguity between sequences and sets, we trust that our intentions will be clear in context. In fact, if hT i i i2I is a sequence of sets indexed by elements of another set I , we can define
so that if S = L i2I T i then the projection S i is equal to T i whenever i 2 I , and ; otherwise. Finally, if is some ordering definable in M and S is a sequence of sets, we define
It is important that we choose a coding scheme with definitions whose basic properties can be verified in a weak theory like I ∆ 0 + (exp) (see below), and such that if I is a cut of M that satisfies this theory, the definitions are absolute between I and M. Finding coding schemata with these properties is not difficult; see, for example, [10] .
If S is a set in M and I is a cut of M, we define
namely, the part of S "seen" by I . A slight extension of Lemma 3.1 yields
is a cut of M closed under plus and times, a are parameters in I , and S is a set in M, then
It will often be convenient to drop the I superscript in S I , as discussed in Section 8. For S and a in M, we define
Note that this agrees with the definition for S I if we identify a with the set of all elements less than a. We use to denote the least-number operator, so that
x (x) denotes the least x such that (x), if such an x exists, and 0 otherwise. The bounded least-number operator
does not look past a for a witness. Below we adopt the practice of naming axioms and axiom schemata with parentheses, so for example if Γ is a class of formulas we will use (Γ-IND) to denote the schema of induction
for formulas ϕ in Γ. The theory I ∆ 0 + (exp) is a weak base theory which includes quantifier-free defining equations for successor, plus, times, and less-than, the schema (∆ 0 0 -IND) of induction for ∆ 0 0 , and an axiom asserting that exponentiation is total. To express this latter axiom one needs to use a ∆ 0 0 formula defining the graph of exponentiation in a reasonable way; see [10] for details.
In I ∆ 0 + (exp) formulas can be coded as elements p q. If contains numeric parameters we can code them using their binary (or dyadic) representations, so that p q becomes an I ∆ 0 + (exp)-definable function of the parameters in .
We fix a universal Σ (p9y (y)q) (2) holds in any model of I ∆ 0 + (exp). After Section 7 we will need to use a formula
which is a Σ 0 1 truth predicate relative to the set parameter Z. Such truth predicates are defined, for example, in [10, 11] .
We are also concerned with building models of theories in the language of second-order arithmetic, which includes variables that range over sets of numbers and a binary "element-of" relation 2. In this language we take only first-order equality to be basic, defining X = Y to mean
We can specify a structure N for the language of second-order arithmetic by presenting a first-order part K, and a collection S of subsets of the universe of K to interpret the second-order variables. In such a situation we will write N = hK, Si.
In the second-order setting we allow Σ 
which asserts that if there is any x satisfying ϕ, then there is a least such x. By (Γ-LEP) we denote the schema in which this principle is applied for formulas ϕ in Γ. The relationship between induction and the least-element principle is given by the following. 
For a proof of this lemma, see [10, 11] .
x4. Ordinals and ordinal notations. In discussing the role of ordinals in proof theory, it is useful to distinguish between the following concepts:
(1) A countable ordinal is an isomorphism class of countable well-orderings. As usual, we can identify countable ordinals with their von Neumann representations as transitive sets that are linearly ordered by the membership relation.
(2) An ordinal notation system is a pre-well-ordering on a set U of terms in a specified language. Intuitively speaking, the elements of U are notations that denote countable ordinals. Each notation α is identified with its Gödel number pαq. Typically it will be clear from the context whether α refers to a notation or its Gödel number; for example, if we refer to α as an element of M then we mean the Gödel number of the notation, and if we refer to the "form of α" (in terms of the function and constant symbols used to build the notations in U ) then α denotes the notation itself.
Saying that the relation is a pre-well-ordering means that it is transitive and reflexive, and that there are no infinite descending -chains. What distinguishes a pre-well-ordering from a well-ordering is that in the former there may be more than one notation for a given ordinal, since α ^ α may hold for distinct α and . From such sets of equivalent notations, it is often useful to identify a canonical normal form representative, which we will write as α. We will use jαj to denote the order-type of α in the associated well-ordering on equivalence classes of notations, and define α to mean that α but 6 α.
If the set (of Gödel numbers of the elements of) U , the ordering (as an ordering on Gödel numbers), and the map α 7 ! α (as a function on Gödel numbers) are primitive recursive (or elementary recursive, polynomial-time computable, etc.), it makes sense to call the ordinal notation system primitive recursive (resp. elementary recursive, polynomial-time computable, etc.).
(3) An ordinal notation system with limit sequences is an ordinal notation system together with an assignment of a cofinal sequence
to every notation α that denotes a limit ordinal. We do not require that equivalent notations have equivalent limit sequences, or that the elements of a limit sequence assigned to a notation in normal form are again in normal form.
If the ordinal notation system is primitive recursive, and the assignment
is primitive recursive, we can say that the ordinal notation system with limit sequences is primitive recursive, etc.
It is usually desirable that basic ordinal functions such as successor, addition, multiplication, exponentiation, and so on are also easily computable in the context of the notations. For the ordinals dealt with in this paper and in [4] it is fairly easy to see that there are elementary recursive notation systems such that the functions in this list are also elementary recursive. Further, it is not difficult to prove simple properties about these functions (algebraic properties and defining equations) in I ∆ 0 . In [31] it is shown that we can find such notation systems for any fixed recursive ordinal.
In this section we will begin by defining a series of ordinals and functions on ordinals from a classical (set-theoretic) point of view, and then point out that in a very standard way, one can use these functions to define terms which denote ordinals. Finally, we will define limit sequences for these notations. The combinatorial properties of α-large sets, defined in the next section, will depend very heavily on our choice of limit sequences, so we will be careful to choose sequences that facilitate our later constructions. On the other hand, the point of these constructions is to obtain the types of proof-theoretic results described in Section 6, which, in contrast, refer only to countable ordinals and ordinal notation systems. One can therefore think of our choice of limit sequences, and the resulting definition of an α-large set, as a convenient stepping-stone to these end results.
The following "refresher course" on ordinals is somewhat brisk. A more detailed development can be found in [17, 18, 24] .
Ordinal addition, multiplication, and exponentiation are defined by transfinite recursion in the usual way. For example, the function α 7 ! α is defined by the equations 0 = def 1 α+1 = def α = def sup f j 0 < < g, for limit ordinals .
Note that every ordinal α satisfies one of the following three criteria:
, in which case we say that α is a successor ordinal α is not equal to 0 and there is no greatest < α, in which we say that α is a limit ordinal. The ordinal corresponds to the order-type of the natural numbers.
The sequence of ordinals n is defined inductively by the following equations:
The ordinal ε 0 is defined to be the limit of this sequence. One can show that ε 0 is the least fixed point of the function α 7 ! α , i.e., the least ordinal such that = . Furthermore, ε 0 is the least ordinal closed under addition and the map α 7 ! α , and any ordinal less than ε 0 can obtained from 0 and finitely many applications of these two operations.
The ordinal ε 0 is sufficient for the analysis of all the theories dealt with in this paper. However, for the theories analyzed in [4] , we will need ordinals that are larger. To go beyond ε 0 , define the sequence α n by 0 (α) = def α α n+1 = def α n , and let ε 1 be the limit of the sequence ε 0 +1 n . Then ε 1 is the second fixedpoint of the operation α 7 ! α , and equal to the set of ordinals that can be obtained from 0 and ε 0 from addition and the preceding operation. More generally, define ε α+1 = lim n εα +1 n ε = sup fε j < g, for limit ordinals , so that ε α denotes the αth fixed point of the map α 7 ! α , as well as the set of ordinals that are obtainable from fε j < αg using finitely many applications of addition and the map α 7 ! α . This process can be iterated transfinitely to give the Veblen hierarchy of functions, ϕ α , defined as follows:
enumerates the fixed points of ϕ α ϕ enumerates the simultaneous fixed points of fϕ j < g, when is a limit.
Note that ϕ 1 (α) is just the ordinal ε α defined in the previous paragraph. It will often be convenient to write ϕ(α, ) instead of ϕ α ( ).
We can continue the process even further, this time diagonalizing across the first argument of ϕ. In analogy to the ordinals n , define 0 = def ε 0 n+1 = def ϕ( n , 0). Then the Feferman-Schütte ordinal Γ 0 is defined to be the limit of the sequence n . Alternatively, Γ 0 can be characterized as the least fixed point of the function α 7 ! ϕ(α, 0), the smallest ordinal closed under the map α, 7 ! ϕ(α, ), and the set of ordinals that can be obtained from 0 using finitely many applications of addition and the function α, 7 ! ϕ(α, ). Also
. The ordinals Γ α are then defined analogously to the ordinals ε α . More precisely, if we set (α) = ϕ(α, 0), the ordinals Γ α enumerate the fixed points of .
Of course, one can continue this process of generating ordinals indefinitely. Obtaining ordinals that suffice for the analysis of stronger theories requires new conceptual methods, some even motivated by large cardinal hypotheses. (See, for example, [17, 18, 20, 21, 22] .) The ordinals and functions just described, however, suffice for the theories we analyze below and in [4] . In fact, for the theories analyzed in this paper it is enough to have notations for ordinals through ε 0 , and so for now we restrict our attention to these. Definition 4.1. Our set of ordinal notations is defined inductively, as follows:
0 is an ordinal notation. If α 1 , α 2 , . . . , α k are ordinal notations other than 0, then so is
If α is an ordinal notation, so is α . ε 0 is an ordinal notation. Notations of the form α + 1 (that is, α + 0 ) are called successor notations. A notation that is neither 0 nor a successor notation is called a limit notation.
Our treatment of ordinal addition violates unique readability, since, for example, the term α + + can be interpreted by associating to the left or to the right. As it turns out, blurring this distinction is convenient, and one can check that the definitions and proofs below are insensitive to the way such a term is parsed. When we refer to notations such as 1, 2, n , and so on, these are to be taken as abbreviations for their representations using 0, +, and . In particular, α n denotes the term
in which there are n terms in the sum.
Terms α denote ordinals jαj under the intended interpretation. We would like to emphasize that these representations are not unique, so that, for example, j1 + j = j j and j ε 0 j = jε 0 j. As described in item 2 at the beginning of this section, we identify a normal form α with each ordinal notation α. When we use α as a variable, we mean that this variable is intended to range over notations in normal form. Both the mapping of notations to their normal forms and the ordering on notations induced by the intended interpretation, can be described in a very effective way [31, 32] . Oddly enough, the details of the ordering are irrelevant to our model-theoretic constructions, which rely instead on the limit sequences we define below. In contrast, the proof-theoretic results described in Section 6 refer only to the ordering of notations, and not the limit sequences. The bridge between these two aspects of the analysis is given by the following fact: if denotes a limit ordinal and [n] is an element of the limit sequence assigned to , then [n] . We now assign sequences of notations [n] to those notations that denote limit ordinals. In each case the corresponding sequence of ordinals j [n]j is increasing and cofinal in the ordinal j j.
Definition 4.2. Sequences are assigned to limit notations as follows. (Here denotes a limit ordinal.)
(
Aside from the occasional "+2" or "+1" which we have added to make our constructions easier, these limit sequences are standard. We feel obligated to point out that equivalent notations might not have equivalent limit sequences; for example [n] = n + 2, whereas (1 + )[n] = n + 3. Furthermore, elements of a limit sequence [n] are not required to be in normal form, even if is.
For reference, a list of the theories that have so far been analyzed with these methods appears below, together with their proof-theoretic ordinals. The first five lines are dealt with in this paper, while the remaining theories are treated in [4] .
Theory
Ordinal
x5. Ordinal largeness properties. In order to define the notion of an α-large set of numbers, we first need to extend the limit sequence function to define
for arbitrary notations α and sequences a 1 , . . . , a k . Intuitively, the definition allows us to "count down" k + 1 steps from α, taking predecessors at successor stages, and taking an appropriate element of the limit sequence [a i ] at limit stages .
Definition 5.1. We extend the limit sequence function to successor ordinals by (α + 1)[n] = def α and set 0[n] = def 0.
The limit sequence function is defined on finite sequences by
Remember that whenever we write
it is to be assumed that the elements a i are listed in increasing order. In that case, we define
With this definition in place, we can finally come to the central combinatorial notion in this paper.
A is said to be exactly α-large if it is α-large, but no initial segment of it is α-large.
So a set A is exactly α-large if the "counting down" procedure hits 0 on the last element of A. The following lemma gives an alternative characterization of the α-large sets.
To take a concrete example, the reader can verify that a set is n-large iff it has at least n elements. Given the definition of limit sequences in the previous section, the set f3, 4 We now provide some basic combinatorial properties of α-large intervals.
Definition 5.4. An increasing partition of a set A is a sequence of sets P 0 , . . . , P k such that A = P 0 P k , and for i < k, max(P i ) < min(P i+1 ). The lemma follows easily from the definitions and induction on the cardinality of A.
Given α, define the function f α by
Using Lemma 5.5 the reader can verify that f (a) > 2a, f 2 (a) > a 2 , and f 3 > a a . In fact, the sequence f α is closely related to the WainerSchwichtenberg hierarchy of fast-growing functions (see [12, 23, 32, 33] ).
In order to get a better sense of the functions f α , define the set ofrecursive functions to be the smallest set that has the usual closure properties of the primitive recursive functions and, additionally, is closed under the scheme of -descent recursion:
The idea is that g( a) bounds the length of the descending sequence of notations less than that is generated by h with parameters a. A function is -recursive if it is -recursive for some . (For further discussion see [29] ; for other characterizations of the -recursive functions see [23, 25] .) It is not difficult to verify that each function f α is α-recursive, so the construction described in Section 2 provides a method of showing that a theory T doesn't prove a certain α-recursive function to be total. In fact, our constructions yield an even stronger result, as described in Section 6.
In Section 7 we will need the following rather technical lemma. Proof. A straightforward induction on the cardinality of A, using the limit sequence definitions from the previous section. a x6. How this provides an ordinal analysis. We would like say a few words about how our constructions provide an ordinal analysis. Saying that the proof-theoretic ordinal of a theory T is less than or equal to α usually entails all of the following results:
(1) There is some formula ϕ(y) such that T doesn't prove TI(α, ϕ(y)), where TI(α, ϕ(y)) formalizes transfinite induction up to α for the formula ϕ(y).
(2) Over a weak base theory, PRWO(α) proves the 1-consistency of T . Here PRWO(α) is a scheme which asserts that there are no primitive recursive descending sequences beneath α, and "the 1-consistency of T " is the formalized Π where X is a new predicate symbol that we allow to appear in the axiom schemata of T .)
Note that the first three results refer to an ordinal notation α, whereas the last result refers to a countable ordinal jαj, in the "real world." Note also that none of these results refer to limit sequences, directly or indirectly.
Suppose we've carried out the program described in Section 2, and built a model of the theory T from an α-large interval. As we've already pointed out, this gives us a model of T in which the assertion
is false, providing an instance of transfinite induction up to α that fails in this model of T . This yields the first result above.
Showing that over a weak base theory PRWO(α) proves the 1-consistency of T requires more effort. As it turns out, we don't need to assume that the underlying model M satisfies all the true statements of arithmetic; in fact, the theory I ∆ 0 + (exp) is sufficient. With some work we can use this fact to carry out the construction in WKL 0 + PRWO(α) and prove the 1-consistency of T there. (Since WKL 0 can prove the completeness and compactness of first-order logic, it is strong enough to formalize a good deal of model theory. WKL 0 will be discussed further in Section 9 below.) Since WKL 0 is conservative over I Σ 1 for arithmetic formulas, we can conclude that the consistency of T is provable in I Σ 1 + PRWO(α).
An even nicer approach, which avoids the use of nonstandard model theory and yields a stronger result, can be found in [30] . Working in primitive recursive arithmetic PRA and using the notion of "Herbrand provability," one can show that "for every a there exists a b such that [a, b] is α-large" implies that "there are arbitrarily large finite approximations to a model of T ." Since PRA + PRWO(α) proves the hypothesis of this statement, it proves the conclusion as well.
To obtain results of the third type, we need to point out that in fact our constructions typically allow us to build a model of T from an α[c]-large interval, for any nonstandard c. Now suppose T proves the function f to be total. In order to show that f is α-recursive, it suffices to show that whenever
is bounded by some α-recursive function. Aiming for a contradiction, then, assume that (4) holds but g is not bounded by any α-recursive function. Then for every n, the standard model satisfies
since otherwise g would be dominated by the α-recursive function f α [n] defined in the previous section. Since (5) is a true statement of arithmetic we can find nonstandard a, b, and c such that
is true in M. But then our construction enables us to build a model of T in which g is not total, violating the assumption (4). (For similar arguments, see [11, 9] .) Finally, one can use our model-theoretic methods to obtain the last type of proof-theoretic result as well. If has order-type greater than jαj in the standard model, then there is an isomorphism between the set of notations less than α and an initial segment of the ordering . Using compactness we can find a nonstandard model M of true arithmetic that comes equipped with such an isomorphism f. Then we "relativize" the constructions with respect to an increasing function g that dominates both f and f ?1 ; for example, take g to be g(x) = def max(ff(y) : y xg ff ?1 (y) : y xg) + x, and, rather than starting with an exactly α-large interval, we begin with the set S = fa, g(a), g 2 (a), g 3 (a), . . . , g l (a)g with l chosen so that S is exactly α-large. Much of the construction proceeds as it did originally, leading to a subset A = fa 0 , a 1 , a k g of S; then we take a limit point of A to get our desired cut I . Clearly, I will be closed under g and hence I will be closed under both f and f ?1 . Furthermore, the sequence of notations
has no least element in I . Using the isomorphism f we are able to get an infinite -descending sequence in I .
x7. Constructing a model of I Σ 1 . We are finally ready to begin the modeltheoretic constructions. The main construction of this section is due to Paris and Kirby (see [13] ). Much of what is presented in this section is worked out in greater detail in [10, 11, 30, 32] . We repeat this well-known construction here since new constructions that come later in this paper, as well as in [4] , are modeled after this one.
As described in Section 2, our goal is to construct sets A = fa 0 , a 1 , . . . , a k g such that if k is nonstandard, various axioms are guaranteed to hold in any limit I of A. The theory I ∆ 0 + (exp) is the weakest theory we want to consider in this regard. Fortunately, it is not difficult to make the axioms of this theory hold in the limit I . 
Proof. If I is a limit of A then I cannot contain the last 3 (in fact, n, for any standard n) points of A. I clearly satisfies the quantifier-free defining equations for successor, plus, times, and less-than. Since the formula defining exponentiation is ∆ 0 0 , I and M agree as to which elements c are equal to a b , and it is easy to verify that the conditions on A then guarantee that I will be closed under exponentiation as well. Finally, we need to handle ∆ might not appear in I . As a result, extending the above result to Σ 0 1 formulas will require some work.
The theory I Σ 1 is a fragment of Peano Arithmetic that adds the scheme of induction for Σ 0 1 formulas to I ∆ 0 + (exp). The following lemma gives conditions on A that guarantee that the axioms of I Σ 1 will hold in any limit. The main idea behind the construction is from [13] , and has appeared in various forms in [10, 15, 14, 30, 32] . Recall that such that A is spread out, and for every i < c the following holds: whenever e < a i , 9y a c Θ(e, y) $ 9y a i+1 Θ(e, y).
Intuitively speaking, the conclusion of the lemma asserts that if e < a i , then any witness to the truth of Tr Σ 0 1 (e) that appears at or below a c in fact appears at or below a i+1 . We defer the proof of Lemma 7.3 so that we can first show how this in fact gives us a model of I Σ 1 .
Suppose the set A satisfies the conclusion of the lemma in our nonstandard model of true arithmetic M. If c is nonstandard, we can find a cut I that is a limit of A. By Lemma 7.2, I will be a model of I ∆ 0 + (exp), and so the equivalence
from Section 3 will hold in I .
Now if e is any element of I , e will be less than a i?1 for some i. The conclusion of the lemma guarantees that the equivalence 9y a i Θ(e, y) $ 9y a c Θ(e, y) (6) holds in M. Since I is an initial segment of M containing a i but not a c , we have the chain of implications 9y a i Θ(e, y) ! 9y 2 I Θ(e, y) ! 9y a c Θ(e, y), and so (6) implies that these are all in fact equivalent. The net effect is that if e is any element of I , we have
Ordinarily we wouldn't expect the left-hand side of (7) to be definable in M, since I is not definable there. Equivalence (7) shows that thanks to our construction, it is in fact definable by a ∆ 0 0 formula. Finally, suppose ϕ(y, z) is any (standard) ∆ 0 0 formula and p are parameters in I . Since I is a model of I ∆ 0 + (exp), the code p9y ϕ(y, p)q will appear in I . Equation (7) and the universality of Tr Σ 0 1 then imply (p9y ϕ(y, p)q, y) ). We want to find a least such e. Since M j = 9y a c Θ(p9y ϕ(e, y)q, y) and M is a model of true arithmetic we can find the least such e in M; but by equivalence (8) this is also the least such e in I . (1), (2), and (4) are immediate in the case i = 0, and (3) follows from the hypothesis that [a, b] is c -large. The construction will continue for c steps. In the end, clauses (2) and (4) guarantee that the set A satisfies the conclusion of the lemma. In following the construction, the reader might find it helpful to keep the following picture in mind: , we can find a c-large set A with the useful properties described above. (Recall that since c is finite, a c-large set is just a set of cardinality greater than or equal to c.) For later sections we will need to generalize Lemma 7.3 in three different ways. First of all, notice that there was nothing special about the fact that [a, b] was an c -large interval; if we started with an c -large set C , we could get a c-large A C having the same properties. Second, using the truth predicate Tr Σ 0 1 (x, Z), we could easily have relativized the construction to any given set T . Finally, the interesting part: using the definition of a -large interval for limits , we can iterate the construction "transfinitely" and show that if we start with an α -large set C , we can get an exactly α-large A C having the desired properties.
These extensions are summarized in the following lemma. The proof is very similar to that of Lemma 7.3, with a bit more bookkeeping at limit stages. Similar iterations play an important role in the sequel of this paper [4] . Proof. We will construct a sequence of sets (1), (2), and (4) are immediate in the case i = 0, and (3) follows from the hypothesis that C is α -large. We will construct C 1 , C 2 , etc., until α i+1 = 0. If we then set k = def i and A = def fa 0 , a 1 , . . . , a k g, the fact that
implies that A is α-large. Clauses (2) and (4) sets P 0 ,P 1 , . . . , P c 0 +1 , each of which is α i+1 -large and such that for each i c 0 , max(P i ) < min(P i+1 ). As in the proof of Lemma 7.3 the pigeonhole principle implies that we can find a j 1 so that ( y max(C i ) Θ(e, y)) 6 2 (min(P j ), max(P j )] for any e < a i . Taking
and applying Lemma 5.6 to the set P 0 , we see that clauses (1-4) now hold with i + 1 in place of i. a x8. Approximating the Turing jump. In this section we address the issue of constructing sets that approximate second-order objects in the limit I , using the Turing jump as our first example.
Recall that if S is a set in our nonstandard model of arithmetic M and I is a cut, we've defined S I to be S \ I . Lemma 3.2 tells us that if ϕ(X ) is a ∆ 0 0 (X ) formula, then
). In particular, as long as the ordered pair ha, bi is in I ,
so that whenever I is closed under pairing, (S b ) I and (S I ) b are equal. Similar properties will hold for the other set formation conventions described in Section 3. As a result, we can safely write I j = ϕ(S) and leave the restriction of the set to I implicit. In practice, we will use the notation S I when we want to emphasize that the set S has "taken on a new life" in I , and leave the I out otherwise. Returning to the construction in Section 7, suppose A satisfies the conclusion of Lemma 7.3, and set
If c is nonstandard and I is any limit of A, we will then have that
In other words, from I 's point of view, S is a complete Σ Proof. Suppose A, S, T , and I are as in the statement of the lemma, and suppose A = fa 0 , a 1 , . . . , a k g. Since I is a limit of A we have I < a k , and if e is any element of I we have that e < a i for some a i in I , and so i < k. If
and hence e is in S. Conversely, if
and since e < a i , and i < k, we have that
Since a i+1 is also in I , this implies that
We've shown that
completing the proof. The proof follows easily from the definitions.
x9. Constructing models of RCA 0 and WKL 0 . RCA 0 is a theory in the language of second-order arithmetic which contains I Σ 1 (set parameters are now allowed to appear in the induction axioms), and a recursive comprehension scheme,
where ϕ(x, u) and (x, v) are ∆ 0 0 (again, possibly with number and set parameters). In words, (RCA) asserts that if one has equivalent r.e. and co-r.e. descriptions of a class of numbers, then there is a set corresponding to that class. WKL 0 is the theory RCA 0 together with a weak version of König's lemma, (WKL) 8T ("T is an infinite binary tree" ! 9P ("P is a path through T "))
where a binary tree T is a set of binary sequences closed under initial segments, and P is a path through T if every initial segment of the characteristic function of P is in T . (The subscripted "0" in the names RCA 0 and WKL 0 indicates that rather than allowing full second-order induction, the induction scheme is restricted to Σ 0 1 formulas, as above.) Let Σ 0 1 -separation be the scheme
where the formulas ϕ and are ∆ Conversely, to derive (Σ 0 1 -SEP) from (RCA) and (WKL), givenφ andˆ define T to be the tree of binary sequences , such that as far as witnesses less than length( ) are concerned, is consistent with a separation ofφ and . A path through T yields the desired separation. See [26] for details. a
In Section 7 we showed how to construct a model of I Σ 1 starting from an -large interval. We now show that we can in fact do better, and obtain a model of WKL 0 . Constructions similar to the one below can be found in [26, 13] . For more information on WKL 0 , see, for example, [26, 27, 2] .
To state the following lemma we temporarily expand the language of firstorder arithmetic to include set parameters P i for i 2 . 
where D j 1 to D j k include all the sets from which the parameters of ϕ and are defined, and ϕ 0 and 0 are obtained from ϕ and by replacing the parameters (D j ) f by the corresponding (P j ) f . By reorganizing quantifiers, we have
Choose i so that each j l < i and the above formula is coded below a i . Then the conclusion of the previous lemma tells us that (9u a c ϕ 0 (x, u, D)^9v a c 0 (x, v, D) ).
We claim that C I , which is in the second-order universe of N, is the desired separation. If
so e is in C . On the other hand, if
D).
Equation (9) then guarantees that
and so e is not in C .
a
We'd like point out that in the proof above C I is not necessarily the set fe j N j = 9u ϕ(e, u)g, since M may see some witnesses u b i+1 that are not in N.
Lemmas 9.2 and 9.3 are sufficient to obtain the ordinal analysis described in Section 6. To provide a more attractive statement of the net result, though, we will use the following trick to code a second-order universe satisfying WKL 0 into a single set: if T d is a sequence of sets indexed by elements of a set D,
and I is a cut that is closed under the pairing operation, then
so that the only sets T T hai,fi .
Let I be any limit of A and let
Since I is a model of I ∆ 0 + (exp) it is closed under pairing, and so it is easy to verify that
We can now apply Lemma 9.3. a x10. Approximating finite jump hierarchies. In Section 8 we discussed the Turing jump. We now extend the discussion to include finite jump hierarchies. 
Proof. Straightforward, once a reasonable coding scheme for formulas has been defined. a In Lemma 10.5 we allow for the possibility that has numeric parameters, in which case p q is really a function of these parameters. In words the lemma asserts that we can determine the truth of from any level H d of the jump hierarchy where d is greater than or equal to m + l .
We now introduce some notation. If H is a c-level jump hierarchy in N, 
or, in other words,
On the other hand, suppose instead that H merely approximates a jump hierarchy in some set A, where H and A are in our nonstandard model M.
If A is spread out and I is any limit of A, we have that
approximates the set fx j (x)g in A.
x11. Proof. Since n+1 = n , by Lemma 10.4 we can find sets A and H in M, so that A is -large and spread out, and that H approximates an n-level
for some c a, so we can find a cut I that is a limit of A. By Lemma 7.2 I is a model of I ∆ 0 + (exp), so we only need to verify that the Σ 0 n least element principle holds in I .
Suppose (x) is a Σ 0 n formula and
Then
and M j = TruthCode(p (e)q, n) 2 H n .
By the least-element principle in M we can find the least e 2 M such that (13) Proof. As in the proof of Theorem 11.2 we can obtain sets A = fa 0 , a 1 , . . . , a c g and H such that c is nonstandard, A is spread out, and H approximates an c-level jump hierarchy in A. Let I be any limit of A, and let J = fj j a j 2 I g, so that J is a limit of f0, 1, . . . , cg. The fact that A is spread out guarantees that hI, fHgi is a model of I ∆ 0 +(exp), and so the previous lemma guarantees that N = hI, fH where ϕ is Σ 1 1 (i.e., ϕ is either arithmetic or obtained from an arithmetic formula by prepending existential set quantifiers). This is often useful in that it allows one to code sequences of sets as a single set and bring secondorder quantifiers to the outside of a formula. By "absorbing" an existential set quantifier if necessary we can safely assume that the formula ϕ in (Σ arithmetically definable from parameters (see, for example, [11, 26] ). And, in fact, the model constructed in the proof of Theorem 11.2 is recursively saturated, because we have a "truth definition" for formulas of nonstandard complexity (see Theorem 11.5 of [11] ). The following theorem draws on this fact. e ) (14) for any e > J , since H e codes all the sets in the second-order universe of N. By ∆ 0 0 induction in hI, fHgi, find the least e such that (14) holds. This e must be in J (if it weren't, then (14) would fail for e ?1 > J ). By arithmetic comprehension in N, define S so that for each x
where f x is the least f such that
ϕ(x, H
[f] e ). Then this S witnesses the conclusion of (Σ 1 1 -AC). a x13. Final comments. Our goal in this paper is not to replace cut elimination as the primary means to an ordinal analysis, but to provide a supplementary approach that helps round out our understanding of the theories involved. We hope the reader feels that this "hands-on" approach to constructing models of the theories described here and in [4] adds to his or her understanding of their axioms.
We expect that these methods will extend, in some form or another, to theories that are significantly stronger. Beyond the predicative theories treated in [4] , the next hurdle, of course, is the analyses of impredicative theories like ID 1 and Π 1 1 -CA. It is our hope that such analyses will ultimately provide us with a better understanding of their models, and perhaps point the way to obtaining some interesting combinatorial independences as well.
We'd like to thank the editors and referees of both this paper and [4] for their comments and suggestions, and Wolfgang Burr and his seminar in Münster for an exceptionally careful and helpful reading.
